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In the Supreme Court
of the State of Utah
RUT II CAFF ALL,
Plaintiff and Respondent,

-vs.\TBl~N

Case No. 8447

CAFF ALL,
Defendant and Appellant.

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT

RESTATEMENT OF THE CASE
The statement of facts as set forth by appellant is
substantially correct. Respondent desires to set a few
additional facts.
Appellant served upon respondent certain Interrogatories. The Interrogatories and the answers made
thereto are as follows : (R. 15)
In answer to the Interrogatory: "Did you marry
C. B. Bradford at Evanston, Wyoming, on the 8th day of
October, 1935 ~", respondent answered she married C. G.
Bradford at Evanston, Wyoming, on said date.
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In answer to the Interrogatory: "Were you legally
married to him on July 20, 1936f", respondent answered
that the question called for a legal conclusion, and that
to the best of her knowledge on said date she was not
legally married to Mr. Bradford.
In answer to the Interrogatory: "If you were not
married to Mr. Br,adford on July 20, 1936, when and
where were you divorced from Mr. Bradford f", respondent answered that she appeared in the District Court
of Salt Lake County during approximately the last week
of October, 1935, with Attorney Mathews for the purpose of obtaining an annulment, which annuhnent she
thought she had obtained.
In answer to the Interrogatory: "Was :Jir. Bradford living on July 20, 1936, and if not, when and where
did he die.", respondent answered that to her best knowledge Mr. Bradford was living on July 20, 1936, and died
sometime in 1939.
Appellant's Counsel stated that the decree of divorce
in the cause before the Court w.as void because appellant
was divorced in June and married in July. (R. 25) Appellant testified that he had heard rm11ors and 'vas suspicious that respondent was a married woman 'vhen he
married her. (R. 26) Appellant since the diYorce of the
parties has remarried and his present "\Yife was in court
at the time of the hearing of this n1a tter.
ARGUMENT
Appellant argues his case under one point: That
the Court cormnitted error in denying appellant's peti-
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tion to vacate and set aside the decree of divorce. The
substance of his argument is that since the marriage
was void because respondent was not divorced from
Bradford, the Court had no jurisdiction of the subject
matter of the action because there was no marriage res
or subject matter, and, therefore, the decree of divorce
was void and should have been set aside.
It is the position of respondent that the Court had
jurisdiction of the subject matter and the decree was not
void, and that defendant should be estopped from attacking the judgment. Respondent shall, therefore, present
her argument under two points as follows:
POINT I.
THE TRIAL COURT HAD JURISDICTION OF THE SUBJECT MA'T'TER AND THE DECREE OF DIVORCE ENTERED
BY THE COURT WAS NO;T VOID.

POINT II.
APPELLANT SHOULD BE ESTOPPED FROM ATTA·CKING THE VALIDITY OF THE DECREE OF DIVORCE.

POINT I.
'THE 'TRIAL COURT HAD JURISDICTION OF THE SUBJE·CT MAT'TER AND THE DECREE OF DIVORCE ENTERED
BY THE COURT WAS NOT VOID.

The gist of appellant's brief is stated on page 8
thereof as follows:
"It seems to clearly follow that if there is
in fact no marriage there would be no res or subject matter over which the court would have juris-
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diction, and any action taken by the court would
be without jurisdiction and void. In the case at
bar the great preponderance of evidence shows
that there was in fact no valid existing marriage
between the parties at the time the action for
divorce was commenced or at the time the divorce
was entered, and for that reason, the court having
no jurisdiction of the subject matter, the decree
was void from the beginning."
Appellant on this subject cites 27 C.J.S., page 812,
and Nelson on Divorce and Annulment, Vol. 3, page 175,
Section 28.27.
A careful reading of the two citations mentioned will
disclose that in both instances the matter under discussion is the jurisdiction of courts over the subject matter of the action. The question of what is meant by
jurisdiction of subject matter in a divorce action is discussed in Nelson on Divorce and Annulment, (2nd Ed.),
Vol. 2, page 619, Section 21.01, under the subtitle of
"Jurisdiction Generally" as follows :
"Jurisdiction of divorce suits and other matrimonial actions has t'vo facets, as in most other
instances : ( 1) jurisdiction of subject matter and
( 2) jurisdiction of the person. The first of these
may be divided, in turn, into t'Yo phases: (a) has
the particular court power to entertain and .adjudicate actions and controversies of the particular kind or type~ and (b) does such residence
or don1icile of one or both of the parties exist
within its territorial jurisdiction as to meet statutory requiren1ents in this respect."
The matter of jurisdictional defects is diseussed in
27 C.J.S. 812, Seetion 169 (c), as follows:
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"A1 divorce decree granted by a court without jurisdiction of the subject matter, or of the
person,~ is void .and should be set aside irrespective of t;he question of fraud."
One of the cases cited in support of the text that
a divorce decr~e granted by a court without jurisdiction
of the subject matter is void, is In re Christiansen, 17
Utah 412; 53 P. 1003. This case points up the meaning
of "jurisdiction of the supject matter."
As the court stated in Anderson v. Anderson, 44 N.E.
(2d) 54, in ruling that the court had jurisdiction of that
divorce action:
"In the instant case the circuit court had
jurisdiction of the p.arties and jurisdiction to
grant a divorce, award alimony and maintenance
and to n1ake a property settlement."
The court stated in Demilly v. Grosrenaud, 66 N.E.

234:
"The question to be decided is whether the
circuit court acquired jurisdiction to render judgment. The court had jurisdiction of the parties
to the suit, but it was also necessary that it should
have jurisdiction of the subject matter of the suit,
and it is in respect to such subject matter that
its jurisdiction is disputed in this case. Juris diction of the subject matter finds its source in the
law creating and governing the court and it is to
be exercised in the mode and to the extent prescribed by law." (Underscoring ours)
Appellant cites .at length from Hutton v. Dodge, 198
P. 165, a Utah case. That case does not discuss the mat-
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ter of the jurisdiction of the subject matter. However,
the excerpts from the case set forth at page 10 of appellant's brief and interesting and support the position
of respondent.
On the matter of jurisdiction of courts, the law as
stated in C.J.S. 21, page 36, paragraph 23, is as follows:
"Jurisdiction of the Subject-Matter.
"Jurisdiction of the subject matter is the
power to hear and determine cases of the general
class to which the proceedings in question belong;
the power to deal with the general subject involved in the action; and means not simply jurisdiction of the particular case then occupying the
attention of the court but jurisdiction of the class
of cases to which the particular case belongs, the
authority to hear and determine both the class
of actions to which the action before the court
belongs and the particular question which it assumes to determine. 'Jurisdiction of the subjectmater' means the nature of the cause of action and
relief sought, and such jurisdiction is conferred
by the sovereign authority which organizes the
court and is to be sought for in the general nature of the court's powers or in the authority
especially conferred on the court."
Again, in the same volume 21, C.J.S., at page 4-! paragraph 35 (b), the law is stated as follo"?s:
"Jurisdiction of the subject matter is defined
supra section 23 as the power to hear and determine cases of the general class to which the proceedings in question belong, and, as used in the
constitutions and statutes, the ",.ord 'jurisdiction'
means as to subject matter only, unless an exception arises by reason of its employment in a
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broader sense. Thus a court has jurisdiction of
the subject matter when it has the right to try
the kind of proceeding, whether it be an action
or suit; when it has jurisdiction of the person
and the cause is the kind of cause triable in such
court; when the matter is one over which the
court's general power extends, and such power
is regularly called into .action by the application or act of the parties concerned.
"Jurisdiction of the subject matte·r is essential in every ease. Such jurisdiction the court
acquires by the act of its creation, and possesses
inherently by its constitution; and it is not dependent on the existence of a good cause of action
in pliintiff in a cause pending before the court;
nor upon the sufficiency of the bill or complaint,
the validity of the demand set forth in the complaint, or plaintiff's right to the relief demanded,
the regularity of the proceedings, or the correctness of the decision rendered."
In the case at bar there is no dispute on the matter
of jurisdiction of the persons. Thus it appears that the
Court had jurisdiction of the action for divorce brought
by respondent and the decree of divorce is not void for
want of jurisdiction.

POINT II.
APPELLANT SHOULD BE ESTOPPED FROM AT'TACKING THE VALIDITY O·F 'THE DECREE OF DIVORCE.

Appellant knew at the time he entered into the marriage with respondent that he was still married to another woman as stated by his attorney. (R. 25) Relying
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upon the divorce, he has remarried and is now living with
another woman. He was also on notice when he married
respondent that she might then be married to another
man. (R. 26)
For these reasons appellant should be estopped to
set up the invalidity of the decree of divorce. In addition, appellant has failed to prove that respondent was,
in fact, married to another man at the time of the marriage.
The law of estoppel in divorce matters is stated in
27 C.J.S. 815, Section 171 (b), as follows:
"As in the case of judgments generally, a
person may waive his right to have a judgment or
decree of divorce set aside or vacated, or may be
estopped by his conduct to ask for such relief.
* * * Similarly, a party who has accepted the
benefits of a decree, or who has acted in reliance
on its validity with full knowledge of its effect,
cannot, after .a lapse of time, and especially after
the death of the other party, have it set aside because it was obtained by fraud or without due
notice."
In the case at bar the decree of divorce "\Yas entered
1n October, 1945. Appellant was cognizant· of all the
material facts at that time. It was not until July of 195-±,
nearly nine years later, that appellant filed his petition
to set aside the decree.
In the case of Cu JJun ings v. H1.tddlesto u, 226 P. 104,
99 Okla, 195, the court said:
'~Conceding that plaintiff~s contention that
the judgment in the divorce action was void for
want of jurisdiction of his person, do the farts
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shown by the record in this case entitle the plaintiff to any relief from that decree~ After being
fully advised and informed as to the existence of
the decree, he made no objection to its validity,
but availed himself of the privilege thereby conferred and contracted a second marriage within
about nine months after learning that the decree
h.ad been entered. After contracting this second
marriage, he continued to live with his second
wife, raising no question as to the validity of the
decree until after the death of his first wife, and
then comes in with a petition to vacate the decree
in order that he may inherit a half interest with
his minor child in the allotment of the dead
woman.
"If there were no established rule of estoppel
in such cases, this would be a most excellent proceeding in which to establish one. However, the
rule is well and generally settled that one who
accepts the benefits and privileges of a divorce
decree by a remarriage, even though the decree
be void for want of jurisdiction, is estopped from
thereafter assailing such decree. Garner v. Garner, 38 Ind. 130; Stephens v. Stephens, 51 Ind.
5-1-2; Sc.ase v. Johnson, 130 Ill. App. 35; State ex
rel. Hahn v. King, 109 La. 161, 33 South. 121;
:rvfarvin v. Foster, 61 l\1inn. 154; 63 1~.W. 484, 52
A1n. St. Rep. 586; Mohler v. Shank, 93 Iowa, 273,
61 N.vV. 981; Riche·son v. Simmons, 47 Mo. 20;
Arthur v. Israel, 15 Colo. 147, 25 Pac. 81, and
Richardson's Estate, 132 Pa. 292, 19 AtL 82. And
the reason for this rule is obvious. Society at
large is interested in the maintenance of the marriage relation and in the faithful discharge of the
duties and obligations incident thereto. But after
those relations have been severed by judicial derree, and that decree fully acquiesced in by the
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immediate parties with full knowledge thereof,
society has no further interest in the property
rights of the parties."
In the case at bar the object of appellant in filing
the action to set aside the decree is solely for the purpose of avoiding his obligation to pay the amounts which
have accrued under the decree for the support of his
children.
A case very much in point is that of Johannesen v.
Johannesen, 128 N.Y.S. 892, 70 Misc. 361, a decision of
the Supreme Court of New York. In that case the facts
were that in 1897 plaintiff married and lived for some
years as husband and wife with one Sandin. One day
she found a letter purportedly written by a woman in
Sweden, who claimed to be Sandin's wife. On being confronted with the letter Sandin admitted he had a wife
living in Sweden. They agreed to separate and went to
a Justice of the Peace in New Jersey. Sandin admitted
to him he had a wife living when he married plaintiff.
The Justice advised that Sandin's n1arriage to plaintiff
was void, and that it was not necessary to procure an
annul1nent. A paper called an "Agreement of Separation" was drawn up, signed and acknowledged by the
Justice of the Peace in which they recited that they had
agreed to live separate and apart. Three years later
plaintiff was employed by defendant as a housekeeper
for him and his four children. He proposed n1arriage
to plaintiff. She disclosed all of the foregoing facts, and
together they went to the Justice of the Peace, and defendant was told by the Justice of the Peace that Sandin's
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marriage to plaintiff w.as void, and that he and plaintiff
were free to marry. They married and lived together
for several years. Plaintiff brought an action for divorce
and defendant entered a plea that the wife was still
married to Sandin. The court in denying the defense of
defendant stated:
"Another feature is presented: under the circumstances can defendant be heard in stultification of his own act~ Can he be permitted to invoke
the judgment of the court declaring his marriage
to be invalid when he, possessed of the knowledge
of all of the f.acts, induced plaintiff to contract
the marriage with him and for over seven years
recognized its validity~"
The court also held that defendant had failed to establish
that the marriage of Sandin and plaintiff was a valid
marriage, and, therefore, that the marriage of plaintiff
and defendant was invalid. The court said:
"Apart from the question of ill treatment, the
issue tendered by the complaint was the marriage
of the parties. This was admitted, but a new issue
was r.aised when defendant pleaded a previous
marriage. This cast upon him the burden of
proving validity of the first marriage and of overcoming the presumption that the second marriage
was valid. While this presumption may be rebutted by evidence and facts invalidating the
marriage, such evidence must be strong, satisfaetory and conclusive, although it involves proving a negative. Senge v. Senge, 106 Ill. App. 140.
""\Vhen a marriage has been shown, says Mr.
Bishop, 'the law raises a strong presumption of
its legality- not only casting the burden of proof
on the party objecting, but requiring him through-
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out in every particular to make plain against
the constant pressure of this presumption the
truth of the law and fact that it is illegal and void.'
I Bishop, Marriage, Divorce and Separation, Section 956.
"It is not sufficient to prove the illegality
of the second marriage to show that at the time
the husband of the first marriage was still living.
McKibben v. McKibben, 139 Cal. 448, 73 Pac. 143.
It must be proven that not only was the first
marriage valid, but that it was subsisting. Before the marriage of the parties would be annulled,
it would have to be proven that the former husband was living and also that the 1narriage was
then in force. This would involve proving a negative, that is, that the 'former marriage had not
been either dissolved or annulled by a court of
competent jurisdiction. The defendant has failed
to make such proof, nor has he proven the validity
of the Sandin marriage."
In the case at bar respondent in answer to the Interrogatories inforn1ed appellant "to the best of 1ny knowledge on July 26, 1936, I was not legally married to Mr.
Bradford." She also informed appellant that she had
attempted through Attorney l\1athews to obtain an annulment within two or three weeks after the purported marriage to Mr. Bradford. The very fact that she infor1ned
appellant that she sought an annulment indicated her
belief that the marriage to Bradford in the first place
was invalid. Appellant has failed to prove its validity.
As the court held in Johannsen v. Johannsen, supra, defendant had failed to prove the validity of the marriage
of Sandin and the plaintiff. Since tl1e appellant has
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failed to prove the validity of respondent's marriage to
Bradford, the presumption of the validity of his marriage to respondent would stand - except for appellant's
adrnission that he was married to another woman when
he married respondent.

CONCLUSION
Respondent submits that the court had jurisdiction
of the subject matter of the divorce, and, therefore,
the Decree of Divorce was valid. Appellant has failed
to establish that the marriage of re·spondent and Bradford was a valid and subsisting marriage ,a.t the time of
the marriage of the parties to this action, and appellant
knowing that he was married to another woman at the
time of the marriage, and having remarried, and having
used the benefits of the Decree of Divorce, cannot nine
years later attack the same solely for the· purpose of
avoiding his obligation to pay for the support of his
minor children as ordered by the court.
The appeal of appellant should, therefore, ·be dismissed.
Respectfully submited,

J. GRANT IVERSON,
Attorney for Respondent
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